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Matters of Suggestibility, Memory and Time: 
Child Witnesses in Court and What Really Happened
Johanna F. Motzkau
Abstract: As a result of an increasing awareness of child abuse over the last few decades, children 
have been admitted as court witnesses more frequently, yet there has been persistent wariness 
about the reliability of their testimony. Examining the interaction of legal rationales and paradigms 
of developmental psychology, it would appear that children are still frequently positioned as 
deficient and passive witnesses. Three tropes can be distinguished: 1. Children are positioned as 
unreliable containers of facts. 2. Children have proved to be irritable dispensers of information. 3. 
Children are volatile interactants. In this paper I will examine how the English legal system employs 
special measures that are designed to manage children's apparent deficiencies while guaranteeing 
the accuracy and admissibility of their evidence. My analysis unfolds around the specific case of 
video recorded evidence. Using courtroom observations and data from interviews with legal 
professionals, I will follow the trajectory of the video from its planning and recording by the police to 
its presentation in court. Inspired by the work of Isabelle STENGERS and Bruno LATOUR, and 
drawing on discourse analytical tools, I will show that the collision of the different time zones of 
veridicality creates circumstances under which the video itself can become an ambiguous agent and 
ultimately a fanciful witness. 
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1. Introduction
Judge: And if you do always tell the truth 
where will you go when you die?
Girl: Up to heaven sir.
Judge: And what will become of you if you tell 
lies?
Girl: Shall go down to the naughty place, sir.
Judge: Are you quite sure of that?
Girl: Yes, sir.
Judge: Let her be sworn, it is quite clear that 
she knows more than I do!
Exchange reported to have taken place when 
Mr Justice MAULE (1788-1858) had to 
examine a little girl on the nature of the oath, 
quote as SPENCER and FLIN (1993, p.51).
Children and the law have always been an awkward couple. Since the late 
1970's, and as a result of an increasing awareness for child sexual abuse, 
children have been admitted as court witnesses more frequently, yet there has 
been persistent wariness about the reliability of children's testimony and about 
their capability to comply with the strict nature of evidential procedures in criminal 
court. In this article I will explore how the English legal system employs various 
artefacts and special procedures that are designed to accommodate children's 
assumed needs in order to enable them to give the most detailed evidence 
possible while guaranteeing the objective nature of the way in which the evidence 
is gathered and presented in court. I would first like to establish the historical and 
theoretical context of issues around sexual abuse, suggestibility and children as 
witnesses and delineate their close interrelationship. My analysis will then unfold 
around the specific case of video recorded police interviews with children. Using 
data from courtroom observations and excerpts from interviews I conducted with 
legal professionals, I will follow the trajectory of the video from its planning and 
recording at the police station, to its final presentation in court. It will become 
clear that, as this video is created and later on performs at the different stages of 
the legal procedure, it resonates with different assumptions and frameworks that 
structure the way in which for example material presences or absences, temporal 
immediacy or mediatedness, are seen to bolster or indeed discredit the credibility 
of a statement. I will argue that those actual particulars that constitute credibility 
and thus an assumption of truth, differ relative to the time and stage during the 
process at which they are considered. This phenomenon could be expressed as 
constituting different time zones of veridicality. Hence taking a close look at the 
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concrete practice it will become clear how this video recorded evidence is created 
in view of-, relates to and mediates different time zones of veridicality. Inspired by 
the work of Isabelle STENGERS (STENGERS, 1997; CHERTOK & STENGERS, 
1992) and Bruno LATOUR (1987, 1999), and drawing on discourse analytical 
tools, I will show how the collision of the different time zones of veridicality within 
the static rules for the production and performance of admissible evidence, create 
circumstances under which the video itself can become an agent in its own right 
and ultimately a fanciful witness.1 [1]
This wide reference to science studies and discourse analysis indicates the 
syncretic methods perspective I am adopting for this paper. While firmly rooted 
within the qualitative social sciences, for my specific analytic focus it proved most 
productive to draw on a variety of tools and perspectives derived from different 
methodological backgrounds. As this is not an entirely unproblematic move, I 
would like to offer a methodological disclaimer before I specify these methods 
any further and embark on my analysis. It has, rightly, been pointed out that there 
is an inherent danger in methodological eclecticism where discourse analysis is 
concerned, because some of the traditions that operate with the term discourse 
"… may be incommensurable in their theoretical and methodological stances, 
including the conflicting roles assigned to the analyst. […] Indeed, the reason Edley 
and Wetherell (1997) call for a deténte is that the terms 'discourse' and discourse 
analysis are fiercely contested" (MC MARTIN, 1999, p.511). [2]
My proposition to additionally draw on ideas derived from science studies, 
arguably makes the issue even more complicated. MC MARTIN's article is a 
crucial point of reference for my inquiry, because she examines a problem very 
closely related to the one discussed in this paper. She suggests looking at 
children's disclosure of sexual abuse as discourse and outlines the possible 
contribution different discourse analytical approaches could make to under-
standing disclosure. I fully appreciate MC MARTIN's warning about the possible 
incommensurability of such approaches; after all it is the fiercely contested, if not 
insoluble, issue of (epistemic) constructionism versus (critical) realism that 
underpins this controversy for example in discursive approaches to psychology 
(EDWARDS, ASHMORE & POTTER, 1995; EDWARDS, 1997; PARKER et al, 
1997; PARKER, 2002). Notwithstanding the importance of such debates, I would 
like to follow my specific analytic endeavour in a wider, more exploratory spirit. I 
will approach the interview data by selectively drawing on some of the analytical 
tools that are associated with discourse analysis and more specifically 
conversation analysis and ethnomethodology (GARFINKEL, 1967; SACKS, 1992; 
POTTER & WETHERELL, 1987). Still, the overall analysis is embedded in a 
critical account of the historical, political and cultural discourses that underpin and 
1 Data used in this article was collected in the context of the author's PhD research project titled 
"Cross-Examining Suggestibility: Memory, Childhood Expertise" (conducted at Loughborough 
University, 2003-2006). The study explores the interdependency of psychological, juridical and 
public discourses around children's suggestibility by examining child witness practice in England 
and Germany. The interdisciplinary approach combines a genealogy of the history and theory of 
suggestibility research with the analysis of empirical data gathered in interviews with legal 
practitioners and psychological researchers/experts in England and Germany.
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shape the acute reality of child witness practice and childhood as such, 
positioning my inquiry more closely to what PARKER termed "critical discursive 
research" (PARKER, 2002; PARKER, 1992; BURMAN, 1994). Yet, ultimately it is 
the theoretical and reflexive spirit of the philosophy of science and science 
studies (STENGERS, 1997; LATOUR, 1987) that guides my inquiry into the 
different time zones of veridicality, because my implicit, underlying agenda is to 
examine the concrete possibilities emerging from what LATOUR expresses so 
pointedly in his comment on the debates around discourse, relativism and 
realism.
"So we do not have to choose between realism and social construction because we 
should try to imagine a sort of mix up between the two ill-fated positions. Rather we 
have to decide between two philosophies: one in which construction and reality are 
opposite, and another in which constructing and realising are synonymous" 
(LATOUR, 1997, xiv). [3]
2. Situating Suggestibility, Child Witnesses and Sexual Abuse
Children have traditionally enjoyed a dubious reputation as witnesses in courts of 
law. In order to contextualise my analysis I would like to begin by recapturing the 
long-standing and intricate connection between issues of childhood sexual abuse, 
child witnessing and suggestibility. [4]
One of the most notorious cases that is still quoted with an astonishing frequency 
as a warning tale about the dangers of children giving evidence in court, are the 
Salem witch trials, that go back as far as the 17th century. These trials, held in 
Salem, Massachusetts in 1692, have since acquired the status of an emblematic 
(and infamous) example for the unreliability of children's evidence.2 Salem saw 19 
villagers executed as a result of the evidence given by a group of children, even 
though the children had at later points during the trial attempted to recant their 
accusations. CECI and BRUCK (1995) suspect that this event is partly 
responsible for the long standing and deeply rooted distrust in child witnesses.3 In 
more recent times this distrust has caused considerable difficulties particularly for 
2 A group of children aged 5 to 16 claimed to have seen the defendants (20 residents of the 
Salem village) flying on broomsticks and to have been haunted by them with appearances and 
spells. In dramatic court hearings some of the children fainted, broke into spasms or appeared 
to throw up nails and pins they reported had been placed in their stomachs by the defendants 
(cf. CECI & BRUCK, 1995).
3 SPENCER and FLIN (1993) warn that references to the Salem trials are problematic because 
very often they provide a scandalised and partial view of the events and central contextual 
factors are forgotten or misrepresented. They point out that while during the 17th century similar 
trials are recorded all across Europe, those cases involving child witnesses represented only a 
small fraction of the huge number of witchcraft trials taking place everywhere. SPENCER and 
FLIN furthermore criticise the common practice to use this as an example for the sheer 
bizarreness of the stories children can come up with, because considering the common beliefs 
of the time (17th century), children's stories were in no way bizarre, they merely reflected what 
most people believed. Finally most of those who quote Salem as a warning tale, seem to forget 
that children very frequently were subject to accusations themselves, were coerced into making 
accusations against their parents, or were incarcerated or punished after having served as 
witnesses because they were seen to be afflicted and thus complicit with witchcraft themselves. 
Considering these harsh consequences there is little reason to believe children had carelessly 
or even deliberately invented or fantasised such accusations (SPENCER & FLIN, 1993, pp.309-
312).
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the prosecution of child sexual abuse, which is the most frequent reason for 
children to be called as witnesses in criminal courts. Perceived as a social 
phenomenon, the concept of child sexual abuse has only formed within the last 
few hundred years4 and, as HAAKEN (1998) puts it, has since had a long history 
of being forgotten and remembered. In the 18th and 19th century there are 
numerous documented cases and scientific references that reflect awareness for 
child sexual abuse all over Europe. Yet around the turn of the 20th century, and 
coinciding with Sigmund FREUD's famous public abandoning of the "seduction 
theory" in 1897,5 there was a growing suspicion about reports of child sexual 
abuse and over time the awareness for the problem waned completely 
(DALGLEISH & MORANT, 2001). This only changed in the late 1960's and 70's, 
when the campaigning effort of the growing feminist movements gained political 
momentum and managed to put issues like domestic violence, rape and child 
sexual abuse back into the public arena (HAAKEN, 1998). The growing 
awareness for child sexual abuse ultimately forced a reconsideration of the 
general distrust that had so far mostly excluded children from testifying as 
witnesses in court. The United States and England for example had strict 
corroboration laws that allowed children's testimony only if it was corroborated by 
an adult eyewitness (SPENCER & FLIN, 1993).6 Additionally in England, 
children's competency to take the oath had to be assessed by the judge, as the 
introductory quote exemplifies. The long-standing tendency to exclude children 
from giving evidence, or to hear them only in very exceptional cases, was echoed 
in frequent references to the Salem witch trials, and at the time it was generally 
supported by contemporary paradigms of developmental psychology and memory 
research.7 Yet, due to the changing climate towards violence against children, 
during the 80's it was now acknowledged that the prosecution of child sexual 
abuse was almost impossible as long as children's evidence was not admissible. 
This resulted in first changes in the juridical systems in Northern America and 
some European countries, which now allowed for example children's uncor-
roborated testimony in cases of alleged sexual abuse. As a result of this during 
the 1980s courts were faced with an increasing number of child witnesses who 
were predominantly testifying as the presumed victims of alleged sexual assaults. 
In the following years Northern America, but also Europe (e.g. England and 
Germany) saw a number of high profile miscarriages of justice around alleged 
child abuse cases. In some of the most notorious cases children were reporting 
4 The concept of "childhood" itself is a product of more recent times (cf. DE MAUSE, 1974; 
ARIES, 1978).
5 In his "Aetiology of Hysteria" published in 1896, FREUD declared that hysteria, a disease then 
recognised as frequent particularly in young women, was the result of childhood trauma caused 
by sexual victimisation. Only a year after its publication FREUD publicly abandoned this theory, 
stating that he had mistakenly assumed the sexual traumatisation was real, whereas now he 
realised that patients' memories of trauma were the result of elaborate fantasies (cf. MASSON, 
1984). 
6 Legal systems differ considerably all over the world, and while the distrust in children's evidence 
was wide spread, some countries have never had explicit corroboration laws (e.g. Germany).
7 Early research into children's memory and suggestibility mostly agreed that children's memory 
was unreliable and particularly susceptible to forgetting and distortions. Yet while early studies 
reported unanimously that younger children are most susceptible to suggestion and that this 
susceptibility decreases with age (cf. COFFIN, 1941), more recent studies, commencing from 
the middle 1980's started to undermine this consensus considerably (CECI & BRUCK, 1993).
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the most bizarre scenarios of ritualistic abuse by multiple perpetrators. Yet, their 
accounts were later identified as the product of coercive and suggestive 
interviewing techniques used by investigators and parents. Driven by the climate 
of intense concern about child abuse, parents and professionals had been 
absolutely convinced something must have happened, and this spurred their (well 
intentioned) eagerness to get a disclosure.8 These cases sparked a sudden and 
intense research interest in children's suggestibility, a topic that had so far not 
been on the scientific agenda at all. So now a huge number of studies looked at 
the degree to which children can be swayed in their statements and can be made 
to believe and report events they have never experienced.9 While numerous 
studies underlined children's general ability to robustly and accurately testify 
(GOODMAN & CLARKE-STEWARD, 1991), the attention of the media was 
caught by research that reported that children were suggestible, and that they 
could indeed be made to believe and report things they had never experienced 
(CECI, HUFFMAN, SMITH & LOFTUS, 1994). Overall this research raised 
methodological as well as ethical questions and it caused heated public and 
academic debates (GOODMAN, QUAS & REDLICH, 1998; CECI, 1998). This 
publicity combined with the media coverage of the miscarriages of justice, 
ultimately fuelled a rather simplistic and scandalised understanding of 
suggestibility research and of children's vulnerability to suggestion. Unfortunately 
this also filtered back into legal decision-making, reinstating a general 
atmosphere of disbelief in children's testimony, making the prosecution of sexual 
abuse even more difficult. Additionally researchers warned that this atmosphere 
could result in a recurring fear in children or parents to report abuse because they 
felt that nobody would believe them (GOODMAN et al., 1998). Hence despite the 
initially established trust in children's ability accurately to remember events and to 
report them in court, there has been a persistent wariness about the reliability of 
children's memory and their ability to testify in court. So it is clear that issues of 
children's suggestibility, their credibility and the problem of preventing, detecting 
and prosecuting child sexual abuse are inseparably linked (see also MOTZKAU, 
2005b). [5]
Given this history and context it also becomes clear that the way in which legal 
rationales and paradigms of developmental psychology interact around children, 
positions children as deficient and passive protagonists in legal procedure.10 Here 
three central tropes can be identified. Firstly, children are positioned as bad and 
unreliable containers of facts. Information is seen to degenerate quickly in their 
8 For the USA see CECI and BRUCK (1995); CECI and HEMBROKE (1998). For England see 
BELL (1988); LEE (1999); BULL (1998). For Germany see for example: STELLER (2000).
9 Suggestibility research itself has a complex history and researchers always struggled to define 
suggestibility. One definition that is used frequently states that suggestibility is "... the degree to 
which children's encoding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be influenced by a 
range of social and psychological factors" (CECI & BRUCK, 1993, p.404).
10 Here my analysis relies heavily on the critical perspectives on developmental psychology, and 
the critique of the concept of development, offered e.g. by BURMAN (1994; 1997), 
WALKERDINE (1984; 1993), and MORSS (1990; 1996). Following their critique one can identify 
developmental psychology's tendency to find children's memory systematically deficient but 
improving with age, to be a result of the implicit assumption of a linear, progressive and 
directional concept of development. For a discussion of this critical developmental work see 
MOTZKAU (2005a); MOTZKAU (forthcoming).
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minds and thus has to be retrieved as quickly as possible. Secondly, children are 
seen be irritable dispensers of information/evidence, as they are prone to 
misunderstand questions and get confused and frightened by legal procedure. 
Hence they need to be treated delicately and with great care when questioned. 
Thirdly children appear as volatile interactants, that is, direct interaction with them 
bristles with reciprocal effects and hazards of suggestion. As I develop my 
analysis I will give some concrete examples of these tropes as they are reflected 
within the practices that surround and condition of child witnessing. [6]
At this point it is worth noting that on a much more abstract level the problematic 
position of children as witnesses is also reflected in international law. Since 1989 
article 12 of the UN convention of children's rights establishes unequivocally that 
children need to be given a voice in legal proceedings concerning them and that 
their statement needs to be given due weight.
"1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child.
2. For this purposes the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, 
or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the 
procedural rules of national law" (General Assembly of the UN, 1989). [7]
On closer inspection however, it becomes clear that this article contains a twofold 
conditional clause. Firstly, the "capability to form an own opinion" and "age and 
maturity" have to be established with regard to each particular child, and there 
need to be criteria for judging this "maturity", which will have to be gained from 
the particular context. So firstly this is a question of developmental psychology. 
Secondly, the "opportunity" provided to be heard is even more open to 
interpretation as it can be realised following the existing rules of the respective 
national law. So secondly this poses a concrete legal procedural problem. LEE 
(2001) argues that this apparent ambivalence towards children, that seems 
implicitly to invalidate the very promise it is attempting to make, was an 
unavoidable ingredient of this law at the time of its creation. If article 12 functions, 
LEE states, it functions to generate and expose, rather than to resolve, the 
otherwise implicit childhood ambiguity and "then lays the responsibility for 
managing that ambiguity on the legislatures and policy-makers of the states that 
have ratified it" (LEE, 2001, p.96). In this sense, I would argue, that for the 
national law the central issue remains a problem situated somewhere between 
psychology and law, between psychological and legal truths; and it has to be 
managed locally, via the practices implemented to handle, negotiate and contain 
such ambiguity. [8]
Referring back to my outline of the history of children and the law, it is clear that 
what LEE terms childhood ambiguity is indissociably linked to societal and 
scientific issues around the acute and serious problem of child sexual abuse on 
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the one hand, and on the other hand the perplexing issue of children's credibility 
and suggestibility. This is the backdrop against which the local practices of the 
national law have to operate and try to address the problem of giving children a 
voice in the face of childhood ambiguity. [9]
In the following I would like to examine the concrete efforts of the English legal 
system to substantiate the abstract demands set out by the convention of 
children's rights in the explicit attempt to give children access to justice and 
particularly to enable a more effective prosecution of child sexual abuse. [10]
3. Child Witnesses and Special Measures in England 
Let me give a brief introduction to the more recent changes in the law of evidence 
concerning children in England and Wales (in the following "England"). This 
should illustrate how closely psychological research interacts with legal reforms in 
this area.11 [11]
In 1988 "Criminal Justice Act 1988" abolished the corroboration rule, according to 
which children's evidence could only be considered in court if it was corroborated 
by an adult eyewitness. The "Criminal Evidence Act 1991" implemented some 
special measures for child witnesses, including the option for children to give 
evidence via closed circuit television and video recording of their initial interviews 
with the police (implemented provisionally). In collaboration with psychological 
researchers guidelines were produced that instructed the police how to conduct 
interviews with child witnesses ("Memorandum of Good Practice", Home Office 
1992). The 1991 Act thereby followed some of the recommendations given by the 
Pigot committee (SPENCER, 1997; SPENCER & FLIN, 1993). This committee of 
high ranking legal professionals had been set up in 1988 to thoroughly review 
child witness practice in England in response to the scandal that erupted around 
the Cleveland crisis.12 Subsequently a group of researchers and academics from 
psychological and legal backgrounds was commissioned to review and examine 
the changes implemented in 1991, and in 1998 the white paper "Speaking up for 
Justice" (1998) was published. Following recommendations made in this paper the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 199913 was passed and provided an 
even more dramatic revision of the law of evidence and criminal procedure with 
respect to young offenders and witnesses (specially in child abuse cases).14 Most 
crucially article 53 of the act states that: "At every stage in the criminal 
proceedings all persons are (whatever their age) competent to give evidence". 
11 For a detailed synopsis and discussion of these changes see SPENCER and FLIN, (1993); 
WESTCOTT, DAVIES and BULL (2003).
12 The so called Cleveland Crisis took place around 1987 and was one of those high profile cases 
where a small number of over-concerned professionals (in this case paediatricians) had, within 
a very short period of time, caused a total of 197 children to be removed from their families for 
suspicion of having been sexually abused. While great distress was caused to the families and 
children, some of which were only returned to their families after months or even years, the 
allegations could not be substantiated in any of the alleged cases (cf. BELL, 1988). For a 
circumspect analysis see LEE (1999).
13 See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1999/19990023.htm. 
14 See also the "Sexual Offences Act 2003" (http://www.cps.gov.org/).
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For my trajectory the crucial aspect of the "Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999" are the special measures that were implemented for vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses (applies to all witnesses under the age of 17). 
• Video recorded interview with police is admitted as evidence in chief (to be 
played in court) 
• Cross-Examination and live evidence can be given via live TV link (CCTV)
• Screening the witness from the accused with a curtain or screen
• Evidence in private (removing the defendant or clearing the courtroom of the 
public)
• Removal of wigs and gowns
• Video recorded cross-examination (suggested but not yet in use) [12]
Alongside the new Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, psychological 
and legal academics developed new guidelines to replace the "Memorandum of 
Good Practice". The result of this collaboration was a document called "Achieving 
best Evidence" (2001). It provides guidelines and instructions for training and 
practice of police officers, and it is designed to help implementing the new rules 
for child witness practice. The Achieving best Evidence (in the following ABE) 
constitutes what is called "soft law", hence it provides principle rules the police is 
strongly advised, but ultimately not obliged, to follow. [13]
At this point it should be noted that parallel to these changes in the legal system, 
the prosecution and conviction rates for cases of child sexual abuse in England 
have seen a steep decline. KELLY (2005) reports that there has been a steady 
decline in prosecution and conviction rates for child sexual abuse cases in 
England since 1977, with conviction rates dropping from 34% in 1977 to 5,5% in 
2002.15 However, the most dramatic drop is reported to have occurred over the 
past decade. While statistics should always be met with suspicion, because a 
multitude of factors might be responsible for the drop in recorded convictions, 
these figures throw a peculiar light onto ongoing efforts to reform child witness 
practice in England. [14]
Before I take a more detailed look at the video recorded interview, let me take a 
step back and establish how these special measures generally relate to the 
principles underlying the rules of evidence. What do they do? [15]
3.1 What do special measures do?!—Mediating absences and presences, 
matter and time 
Roughly speaking the law of evidence is based upon the principle right of the 
accused to confront their accuser in person, that is, immediately. This encounter 
needs to take place in open court and the accused should be able to cross-
examine the accuser and witnesses there and then (or have their counsel cross-
examine them on their behalf), in order to challenge the accusations. Furthermore 
15 This leaves England way off at the bottom of the international statistics (these usually refer to 
Northern America and Europe), with only Ireland showing lower conviction rates than England.
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the defendant has the right for this to happen in the presence of a group of the 
defendant's peers who will judge the case. All those material facts that are 
disputed must be proven by evidence, and here immediate oral evidence has 
precedence over other forms of evidence (for a summary see SPENCER & FLIN, 
1993). Hence presence and immediacy play a crucial role for the finding of fact. It 
is the immediate clash of opposing accounts in front of the jury that is ultimately 
seen to enable the jury to determine the fact of the case. Special measures 
clearly run counter to these legal principles. Still, they attempt to mediate 
absences and presences in a way that preserves the rights of the accused and 
thus guarantees a fair trail. But simultaneously these artefacts and practices aim 
to facilitate the process of giving evidence for children by mediating and altering 
their necessary presence in the courtroom in a way that is perceived to be less 
intimidating to children. Beyond the obvious intention to accommodate what are 
perceived to be children's special requirements, the paramount legal argument in 
favour of this "softening" of principle rules of evidence, is the aim to achieve "best 
evidence". These measures, it is hoped, provide conditions under which children 
are most likely to provide the most detailed and accurate accounts of what really 
happened, because they feel less intimidated or confused. One could say that 
minimising fear or indeed minimising the possibility of fear being suggested to the 
child, serves as a form of informational hygiene for the production of better 
evidence. Let me give an overall sketch of how the special measures achieve 
this. [16]
Generally the measures are set out to mediate the child's physical, spatial or 
even temporal relationship to the courtroom. The screen (curtain) for example 
intercepts the visual space between the child and accused, thereby mediating 
their physical presence in the courtroom. While both, the child and the accused 
are physically (immediately) present, the screen makes the child invisible to the 
accused (and vice versa), but keeps it visible to the court and the jury, and 
audible to everyone in the courtroom. Hence the screen can be seen to filter 
information as to allow only those aspects assumed to promote good evidence 
and fact finding. Removing the public or the defendant from the courtroom 
mediates, and thus enables the child's presence in the courtroom via the absence 
of those who the child might perceive as intimidating. It alters the immediate 
physical structure or scene of the courtroom. In a similar sense the removal of 
wigs and gowns will change the immediate setting of the court for the child by 
making it less imposing and thus, arguably, less intimidating. Closed circuit 
television goes a step further by mediating across the spatial relations. It allows 
the child to be absent from the courtroom, by transmitting the child's televised 
image from a different room (or even building) onto a television screen in the 
courtroom. So in a sense the television screen takes the child's physical place in 
the witness box, as a witness that is hoped to resonate much less irritably with 
the courtroom than the child itself might do, and in reverse might be less 
ambiguous to the court.16 So here one could say that it is an element of potential 
16 Obviously, for the child this means that the court personnel (defence barrister, prosecutor and 
judge) is replaced by the television screen the child is looking at, where their faces will appear 
or vanish depending on who is talking to the child. Instead of the courtroom the child will be in a 
small room dedicated for CCTV transmission. The child is sitting right in front of the television 
set, with a video camera focussed on their face. Only one person can be in this room with the 
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mutual irritation that is filtered out by the mediation across space. Still, this is a 
life transmission, so while being physically absent the child still shares the actual 
immediate time frame of the ongoing trial and it will be cross-examined in real 
time by the barristers via the CCTV link. In this sense one can say that CCTV 
mediates children's voice within the same time zone, but across space. [17]
Video recorded evidence of children goes a step further even. The police will 
video record the investigative interview they conduct with the child as soon as 
possible after an incident has been reported. Subsequently this video will not just 
be viewed by the prosecution to decide whether to prosecute or drop the case, 
but in case of a trial it will also be played in court. For the trial this video will fully 
substitute the children's "evidence in chief". ("Evidence in chief" is the initial 
evidence given by a witness under the guidance of the lawyer who called them. It 
forms the basis of the subsequent cross-examination, which for a child will be 
conducted via CCTV.) Hence similar to the CCTV this video poses as a proxy 
witness on children's behalf. While they are absent the video mediates their 
presence, it mediates across space representing them in court as a reliable 
witness, not irritable or fearful. But this video additionally mediates children's 
voice across time. It preserves their voice from the initial interview and transports 
it to the time of the trial. This is meant to ensure that children's account is 
collected as early as possible, in order to stabilise it by preserving it on tape and 
thus making sure nothing can alter it or be forgotten over time (the time between 
reporting and trial may well exceed 10 months). In a sense one can say that this 
video transmits the immediacy of the initial interview by the police into the 
immediate presence of the courtroom, allowing these two time zones to overlap in 
order to enable the earliest possible account of the child to be presented and 
heard in court in an unambiguous and objective fashion, that is, delivered by a 
video tape. [18]
Let me reverse the gaze for a moment in order to return to the three tropes I have 
outlined earlier. Looking at these measures as they organise the performance of 
children's "best evidence", we can see how these measures also reflect children 
as passive and delicate, if not slightly deficient vessels of information. Children 
are positioned as unreliable containers of information. They cannot contain 
evidence and it degenerates quickly in their immature minds. Hence it needs to 
be preserved on video as soon as possible, so the video can become the carrier 
of the evidence on the child's behalf. Children are positioned as irritable 
dispensers of evidence. The concrete presence of a defence barrister, the 
defendant, wigs, gowns, jury members, the physical arrangement of the room etc. 
is seen to potentially alter their evidence. It can hamper the clarity or consistency 
of its production, or it might even destroy it altogether by silencing the children (or 
reducing them to tears). So it is seen as beneficial to intercept their performance 
with a CCTV transmission. One could say that the television screens, substituting 
the court personnel for the child and respectively substituting the child in the 
courtroom, are there to help purifying the child's performance so that the 
evidence can emerge unhampered by adverse influences. Ultimately children are 
child, a neutral supporter/observer. This will usually be the court usher or a member of the 
witness support service that operates in most courts in England.
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also positioned as volatile interactants. The measures reflect the reciprocity of the 
problem, because any direct encounter with children is implicitly seen to bear the 
potential danger of unwitting misunderstandings and suggestion. The number of 
direct encounters is thus kept to a minimum, by using videos and television 
screens that are hoped to represent children in court unambiguously. And, as I 
will illustrate in more detail in the following, those who do directly interact with the 
children, the police officers, will have to be trained according to, and will need to 
abide by strict guidelines, in order to stabilise their encounter with the child. [19]
On the one hand we can see how the historically manifest suspicion against 
children as witnesses is implicitly reflected within these measures. Still, on the 
other hand it is important to remember that these special measures are the 
concrete and well intended attempt to handle and contain childhood ambiguity. 
They are intended to preserve, transport and amplify children's voices. [20]
4. The Case of Video Recorded Evidence: Creating a Reliable Witness
While all of these different measures call for a detailed analysis, here I can only 
focus on one of them. I would like to follow the trajectory of video recorded 
evidence as it is cutting across time and across space. I will do this by exploring 
in detail some of the discourses around its production and performance, in order 
to see how it actually functions within the legal system. [21]
In my general introduction to English child witness practice I have already 
outlined the legislative-, research- and policy-making effort that has gone into 
creating and implementing these new measures. But intense effort is also going 
into instructing and training police officers. They are the ones who encounter child 
witnesses directly, and they need to produce the video recorded evidence in a 
manner compliant with the law of evidence as well as following the guidelines on 
interviewing child witnesses outlined in the ABE. Hence I will pick up the video's 
trace where it initiates, that is, within the comments and discussions of police 
officers on a training course, where they learn how to conduct a video recorded 
interview following the guidelines of the ABE.17 [22]
4.1 Time zones of veridicality: absences, presences, accountability
Video interviews are conducted in a special video interview room at a police 
station that is equipped with cameras. Two officers are involved, one officer 
conducting the interview and another officer monitoring the interview and the 
equipment from a room next door. The following discussion takes place on the 
third day of the training course I attended. Over the previous days the officers 
have rehearsed the law of evidence because the interview needs to comply with 
17 The course is called "Video Interviewing Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses". Courses vary 
hugely across English police forces. The course I attended in summer 2004 to collect the data 
used in this paper, ran full time over six consecutive days with around 12 participants 
(experienced as well as career young police officers). Officers can volunteer, but are usually 
assigned to participate. It is the expressed aim of the police forces to train every single police 
officer in video interviewing children, in order avoid delays and enable an immediate response if 
sexual abuse is reported.
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courtroom procedures to be admissible in court. They have talked about inter-
viewing techniques appropriate to children and about the possible problems they 
might encounter with regard to silencing children or suggesting something to 
them. At this point they have spent all morning learning that it is crucial to build a 
good rapport with the child in order to draw out detailed information while avoiding 
misunderstandings and suggestion. [23]
The following discussion ensues around section 2.99 in the ABE guidelines. The 
section states that comfort breaks should be allowed any time, but if children 
need to leave the room to go to the toilet, police officers have to accompany them 
to the toilet and make sure they do not speak to anybody (ABE article 2.99, p.35). 
1 TO:18 […] but why do we do it? It's this issue about whether they've been what? 
conduced
2 cajoled (1) threatened that's the issue […] but I find that (3) a little bit a bit a 
bit you 
3 know (1) it it it's a:::lmost like saying like you a::::::re hhffff °taking this person 
into 
4 custody° ((PO1: hmm)) I would if I wanted to go to the toilet during the course 
of an 
5 interview at a police station the last thing I would expect is for the p'liceofficer 
to follow 
6 me out of the interview room to the toilet=
7 PO1: if the tape's running whilst they go to the toilet (2) you're gonna be seen on 
the tape 
8 anyway (1)
9 TO: you're gonna be seen? 
10 (1)
11 PO2: you're gonna ruin the rapport
12 (1) 
13 TO: you're gonna ruin the rapport? by going to the toilet with them?=
14 PO2: Yeah I think so it's quite intimidatin'
18 "TO" is the training officer and PO1/PO2/PO3 are participating police officers. For this article I 
have slightly edited the excerpts by omitting a few lines. Omissions are indicated by square 
brackets "[…]". Still, the overall character of the exchanges is not altered by the omissions. Full 
recordings and transcripts are in the author's possession. The transcript notations used are a 
simplified and modified version of the system developed by JEFFERSON (1984). For further 
discussion on issues of transcription see also WETHERELL and POTTER (1992) and 
ASHMORE et al. (2004). Explanation of transcript notations: Pauses appear in rounded 
brackets indicating seconds: "(1)"; Speaker emphasis is indicated by "underlining"; Overlapping 
turns are indicated in "[square brackets]"; Minimal acknowledgement tokens by other speakers 
are indicated in "((double rounded brackets))"; Silently voiced utterances are indicated by 
"°degree signs°"; Words drawn out by the speaker are indicated by "col::ons"; A turn interrupted 
by a take up of another speaker is indicated by an equals sign "="; Rising intonation is indicated 
by a question mark "?".
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15 TO: I think it's potential to offend them 
16 PO2: °yea°
17 [[...]]
18 TO: I think (.) it's it's it's I just think that tha' we are fixated with th::iss uhm this 
fear of of 
19 evidence being (.)=
20 PO1: [°tainted°]
21 TO: [bei]ng tainted or it o:r the evidence being or as bein' accu::sed o::f cajoling 
and tainting 
22 the evidence b:y not being able to account for every single mo::ment that we 
are with
23 them ummm and I think I think it's easily suggested by any defence barrister 
tha' I you
24 know a defence barrister worth their weight in gold could easily suggest at 
any point
25 during the course of any proceedings that any witness comes in and deals 
with you that
26 at any point you've suggested something to them or induced them and said 
something
27 °to them° and we wouldn't have evidence to say anything otherwise other 
than no I
28 didn't ummm s:::o I I you know it says in the::re and that's what it says it says 
that you
29 should accompany them to the toilet and ensure they don't speak to an'body 
else
30 °etceteraetcetera° I just think that's a little bit (1) asking a bit too °°much°°
31 PO1: but effectively your integrity is supposed to be intact isn't it because if 
anybody else=
32 TO: why? 'cause you'r a policeofficer?=
33 PO1: °yes° absolutely
34 (2.5)
35 TO: °yea ok° I I'm you know (1) it's horses its its what the the the=
36 PO1: I think you can stand up in court and answer all the questions that they're 
asking you
37 and you'll say no they weren't interfered with no this didn't happen that didn't 
happen 
38 ((TO: yes)) [umm]
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39 TO: [all the time] they were with me
40 PO1: yes 
41 TO: I can say that nothing untoward occurred=
42 PO1: °your honour°
43 (1)
44 TO: °yea°
45 (1)
46 PO3: °we'll have cameras in the toilets then next time°
47 TO: Sorry?
48 PO3: next thing an' we'll have cameras in the toilets 
49 TO: (chuckles) 
[Excerpt 1] [24]
Let me begin by capturing the overall scope and tone of the discussion. There is 
a constant, almost circular shift between colliding issues, made even more 
peculiar by the fact that it is the training officer who explains the guidelines while 
simultaneously presenting caveats against them. Additionally, it seems, the 
officers need not only be concerned with what is on the video, but they should be 
even more worried about what is not on the video. The training officer states 
clearly why it is they should accompany witnesses to the toilet, and he delivers a 
neat three part list ("conduce, cajole or threaten" lines 1-2). But then this might 
"ruin the rapport" (11), intimidate or "offend" (15) the witness, which the officers 
must avoid under all circumstances because as a result of this they might not get 
any information from the witness. And they also should not be too obsessed with 
"tainting" the evidence, as the training officer finds, while he simultaneously goes 
on to imply that there indeed is a need to already plan how the video presents the 
witness in court, and how the video itself is presented. And that indeed means to 
be able to "account for every single moment" (22) and to perform their task in a 
legitimate way. And here one of the officers reminds him that this ultimately 
means to keep their own "integrity intact" (31), as well as the integrity of the 
interview. Yet this again collides with the duty to facilitate the disclosure because 
it might ruin the rapport if it means going to the toilet with the witness. Following 
this exchange, the production of such a video seems to be a paradoxical task. 
And the video, instead of being a plain record, a neutral objective witness by 
proxy, seems a rather ambiguous protagonist that in itself needs to be accounted 
for. Let me take a closer look and isolate three salient aspects reflected in this 
excerpt. [25]
Firstly, by introducing a sense of complete, unadulterated footage, total visibility, 
the video simultaneously highlights the relative lack of visibility around itself. By 
minutely accounting for one space, it also produces a totally unaccounted, 
invisible space around it, and this space now produces heightened sensitivity. 
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And while at first it looks as if the video will also be a neutral witness on behalf of 
the police officers, confirming their good conduct as they are "seen on the tape" 
(7), the video finally turns out to be a rather ambiguous witness that produces 
more uncertainty than it resolves. This is reflected ironically in the statement 
concluding this debate. Ultimately it seems, the issue can only be resolved by 
extending footage and visibility endlessly, by making it unlimited, which means to 
install "cameras in the toilets", as one officer remarks. Interestingly this also 
evokes a sense of the video being a form of surveillance, rather than just a 
neutral record. It is eyeing the officers' activity suspiciously. [26]
This links up to the second aspect. Traditionally a police officer would have 
interviewed a child witness, recorded their statement in writing and summarised it 
for the file. There may have been concerns about the officers' conduct, but by 
and large the practice functioned based on the fact that the officers were reliable 
recorders of evidence by virtue of being police officers, by virtue of being part of 
the investigative legal machinery. In this sense one could say the officers 
constituted what LATOUR refers to as a "black box" (LATOUR, 1987), making it 
virtually (and practically) impossible to challenge their practice.19 Yet with the 
video recording this has now changed, the black box of the police officer as a 
reliable and neutral "evidence-gathering-machine" has now been opened and we 
get an intimate view of what is going on inside. Above and beyond the question 
whether this opening of the black box is a good thing or not, it is clear that as 
soon as we can see what they are doing, their actual performance becomes a 
matter of debate and strict rules are needed to regulate their conduct. Now the 
officers have to actively produce their integrity. They have to produce it at the 
very moment of the interview, but also for the prospective immediacy of the 
courtroom presentation of this video. And this links up to the third aspect. [27]
Thirdly, a closer look at this excerpt shows that the impression of paradoxicality 
we get when following the exchange, is also a result of the simultaneous efficacy 
of two different time zones. The paradoxicality arises from the officers attempts to 
simultaneously operate within, and with regard to, two different time zones. In the 
immediate time of planning and conducting the interview it is paramount to 
maintain a good rapport, because it is in this time that the child will talk to the 
officer and here only a good rapport will enable a detailed and accurate account 
to emerge and be recorded. Hence it is in this time that going to the toilet with 
them appears like taking them "into custody" (3) like a suspect. Here this is 
obviously contraindicated because it is likely to offend them, and it is in this time 
that it is indeed a sign of being fixated with a fear of the "evidence being tainted" 
(19-21) and thus it is indeed "asking a bit too much" (30). Yet, these utterances 
are simultaneously interspersed by considerations and comments that operate 
within, and project forward into a completely different time zone. And that is the 
time zone of the trial, where the video will again perform immediately, where 
19 LATOUR uses this expression to describe the way in which scientific and technological work, if 
it operates successfully, manages to close black boxes. That is, to establish an area where a 
matter of fact is settled in such a way that one need only focus on inputs and outputs, while its 
internal complexity is rendered opaque (see LATOUR, 1987; 1999). STENGERS sums this up 
neatly: "A black box establishes a relation between what enters it and what leaves it in such a 
way that no one has, practically, the means to contest it" (STENGERS, 1997, p.86).
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courtroom procedure applies but where truth is generated by completely different 
means. This intermingling of time zones is particularly obvious within the training 
officer's turn from line 21 to 30, because here the utterances relating to the time 
of the interview literally form a frame around the intermediate illustration of what 
is representative of trial time. Following the extreme case scenario that the 
training officer unfolds step by step in lines 23 to 27, this time of the trial presents 
itself as a time zone where truth is guaranteed by the application of intense and 
systematic uncertainty. The whole paragraph consists of extreme case formu-
lations, arranged to add to an escalating sense of arbitrariness, culminating in the 
reference to the guidelines. Initiating the account by the adverb "easily" and 
following this up with five mentions of "any", this almost creates a sense of loss of 
control, of a space devoid of direction and reason. One has to account for "every 
single moment" (22); and it can be "easily suggested by any defence barrister 
[…] at any point […] during any proceedings that any witness comes in and deals 
with you that at any point you have suggested something to them … and you 
couldn't say anything …" (23-27). One could almost say the training officer 
implies in ironic hyperbole that it is ultimately pointless to even bother following 
procedure because a defence barrister could always destabilise their account. 
Yet, beyond the training officer's potential irony, this account reflects the implicit 
paradox of time, the exasperation of facing a task that seems virtually insoluble, 
because it means to operate at one moment but within two time zones; the time 
zone in which the interview is conducted and the time zone of the trial. Yet at this 
point, to resolve the problem, the guidelines are mentioned (28). And again the 
training officer's triple repeat of the reference to the guidelines, adds a rather 
ambiguous, incredulous tone to the reference: "it says in there and that's what it 
says it says …" (28). Still, it is clear that the guidelines are supposed to address 
the problem and they propose that every step along the way has to be rule based 
so that it can be accounted for. Therefore it is fundamental that the police officers' 
integrity is intact. And again we can see that this "integrity" is not given by virtue 
of their position as police officers. But the black box has been opened, and it is 
precisely because they are police officers (32-33), that their integrity has to be 
actively produced and affirmed. And again, it has to be produced at the time of 
the interview, but following trial rules, because it is produced in anticipation of 
courtroom appearance, where it can be displayed in the way the two officers 
demonstrate in an almost stage like exchange (36-42). The closely interweaved 
dialogue and the particular way in which turn taking develops could be analysed 
in much more detail, but I would like to trace the broader dynamic involved. So let 
me move on to examine how the video performs at other stages of the process. [28]
Accounting for every step along the way means that the so important initial stage 
of the interview, the rapport stage, needs to be recorded on video as well. Hence 
this rapport stage, where the officer will conduct an informal conversation with the 
child in order to establish an open and friendly atmosphere, will end up being 
shown in court as well. And here the training officer reports what a judge has said 
about the effect this has on the jury.
© 2007 FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/
FQS 8(1), Art. 14, Johanna F. Motzkau: 
Matters of Suggestibility, Memory and Time: Child Witnesses in Court and What Really Happened
1 TO: The only thing that judge Smith20 bless him says is that the jury switch off 
during the
2 rapport stage so whilst this book21 concentrates on how it is so important to 
get that
3 rapport in the interview he quite clearly said that they switch off=
4 PO1: He's right he's absolutely right
5 TO: you know s:::o you have to weigh up well that's what's our question perhaps 
if we can do
6 our rapport pre-interview assessment then you only need a shorter rapport 
on your actual
7 video to make them comfortable and then later on at court the jury won't 
switch off well not
8 switch off quite as quickly as °perhaps°
[Excerpt 2] [29]
So after all, the rapport, which the guidelines suggest is so important for achiev-
ing best evidence, seems to be the very thing that will undermine the value of this 
evidence in court, because the jury switches off and might end up missing impor-
tant aspects of the evidence because their attention has wandered. So here the 
video is a rather awkward witness on the child's behalf, it performs the evidence in 
an unpredictable way. And again we can see the collision of time zones, between 
what "the book" suggests for the interview and what the judge reports from the 
courtroom (1-3). But now there is an even clearer sense of these being different 
time zones of veridicality, because they differ with regard to the way in which the 
truth is established within them. The very aspects that bolster and underline chil-
dren's evidence in the time zone of the interview, the rapport and trust that enable 
them to deliver a full narrative, will produce an awkward impression in the time zone 
of the trial. Here the rapport appears tedious and lengthy, and it might ultimately 
distract from the relevant evidence. Lines 5-8 show the precariousness of attempting 
to handle this collision. The officers should try and "weigh up" (5), refine their im-
mediate actions in the interview, relative to the assumed, to be anticipated imme-
diate impression this will make on prospective jurors and their specific attention 
span, while still managing to "make" children "comfortable" (7). And here tellingly, 
the training officer's recommendation remains suspended in an unfinished sen-
tence, fading tentatively on the word "perhaps" (8), thus underlining the relative 
dubiousness of such an endeavour. Clearly the video is not just awkward in its 
production, but it is a shifty witness as it performs in court. Even those things that 
are on the video seem to change value when transferred from one time zone to 
the other. And this is even more apparent in the next excerpt, where an officer 
insists that to gather a clear account they might have to challenge the child. Yet 
20 Name changed by the author.
21 The training officer refers to the guidelines "Achieving best Evidence".
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the training officer reminds them that it is the time of the trial they are simultane-
ously positioned within, and that this is the time they have to operate towards. 
1 TO: Is it so urgent to challenge a witnesses evidence at that point in time?=
2 PO1: well it could be that's the thing couldn't it [[...]]
3 TO: […] if it is one interview that is played before the court we've already 
particularly if the jury 
4 get to see that aspect of it we have already ahm (.) we're implanting a seed in 
their mind that 
5 we actually don't believe it [...] which is ammunition for the defence.
[Excerpt 3] [30]
So the video indeed is not a neutral and unambiguous witness, it does not deliver 
what it is entrusted with objectively to the court. When transposing the immediacy 
of a challenge that could, during the interview, help to clarify things and might 
thus strengthen the evidence, into the courtroom, it ends up undermining the 
evidence. In this different time zone of veridicality, in the courtroom and thus in its 
new immediacy, the challenge acquires a different meaning, because here a 
different structure applies. Here the challenge implants "a seed" (4) in the minds 
of the jury that not even the police believes this witness and this also opens a gap 
that can be utilised strategically by the defence (5). The expression "implanting a 
seed in their mind" (4) is interesting because it gives a sense of the prospective 
jury's passive and imponderable perceptiveness towards the video, that 
nonetheless needs to be anticipated with extreme delicacy. [31]
4.2 Time zones, duration and sequentiality: what really happened …
Ultimately, above and beyond the concerns of the police officers, in the courtroom 
the collision of the two time zones of veridicality culminates around issues of 
duration and sequentiality. I have observed this phenomenon myself during trials, 
but I would like to present it by quoting a legal professional and researcher I 
interviewed, because she sums it up neatly. 
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1 A: […] I found where (1) ahm there was evidence in chief given alive in court (1) 
the time it 
2 took you know was much shorter because the prosecuting lawyer will focus on 
what is 
3 going to prove you know the charge (1) and they draw it out and when they felt 
they got 
4 enough they stop (1) ((hmhm)) so that might take twenty minutes whereas your 
pre recorded 
5 evidence might be an hour an a half […]
[Excerpt 4] [32]
Firstly the issue of duration is crucial. Referring to the trial she points out that the 
evidence emerges in a concise and short period of time when the prosecutor 
"draws it out", because they will only draw out exactly what they think is needed. 
Secondly, and closely related to this, there is the issue of sequentiality. That is, 
the order in which this evidence emerges in a video recorded investigative 
interview. 
1 A: […] the investigative interview can you know it doesn't proceed a b c d e nicely 
in a
2 straightforward fashion it can go backwards forwards […] so the way the 
evidence emerges 
3 can be quite disordered and […] it could make it difficult I think for a jury to 
hang on to 
4 some of that information simply because it wasn't being produced in a nice 
sequential way 
5 […] I don't know I mean I did think sometimes simply because the way 
evidence emerged 
6 in an investigative interview was so non-sequential sometimes that that could 
reflect 
7 negatively in a court situation […] 
[Excerpt 5] [33]
So above and beyond the concerns of the police officers, in court the video is a 
fanciful witness. By transmitting the very nature of the investigative interview, that 
is, the disorderliness and duration that qualify its immediate nature, into the 
courtroom, the video ends up undermining children's evidence. The very things 
that represent veridicality within the time zone of the actual interview (i.e. 
immediacy, spontaneity of information that might emerge in a disordered 
fashion), have the contrary effect within the time zone of veridicality constituted 
by the trial. Here evidence needs to be immediate but highly structured. It is 
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expected to emerge in a highly controlled and sequential fashion via the ordering 
activity of the barristers. This is usually most obvious for the defence barrister, 
but it similarly applies for the prosecution examining their witness, because they 
will also extract an orderly sequence of events from the witness that can prove 
the case and impress the jury. And here the video, which is assumed to be the 
most stable and predictable of witnesses, turns unpredictable, because it short-
circuits time zones of veridicality, it short-circuits the investigative time of the police 
with the fact finding time of the court. In other words, it disturbs the sequentiality of 
the overall investigative process. [34]
Here my analysis links up neatly with SCHEFFER's elaborations on the role of 
sequentiality for the defence case (SCHEFFER in this issue). Sequentiality is not 
just important for the way in which a specific account emerges in court, but it is 
also central for the overall organisation and transition evidence undergoes from 
the investigative to the trial process. SCHEFFER argues that it is the defence 
barristers who unfold the "field of presence" (FOUCAULT, 1972), within which 
they contrast, confront, juxtapose and thus integrate all previous statements, 
skilfully carving out their particular shape and intended efficacy within the trial. As 
I said, the same must be true for the prosecution, but where the video is being 
played, they cannot unfold their field of presence, they have to stand back while 
the video clutters the field of presence with information from another time zone. [35]
5. Epilogue: Purification, Tape-Fetishism and What Really Really 
Happened
I would like take a step back again and close this analysis by looking at the 
structural dynamics implicit to the problem I have described. As a tentative 
outlook I will hint at two wider theoretico-methodological issues closely related to 
the problem discussed here. [36]
Looking back at the police officer's activity, their declared task can be described 
as an attempt to purify children's evidence, to free it from ambiguity. This is a 
move similar to what STENGERS (1997) outlines as the crucial change in the 
natural sciences during the 18th century. A move that she also finds reflected in 
FREUD's shaping of psychoanalysis as a science.
"Just as the eighteenth-century chemist no longer deals with the materials that he will 
use in the natural world, no longer studies the unpurified primary materials that the 
artisan transformed, but 'creates his object', the analyst institutes a state that has all 
the aspects of an 'artificial illness' …" (STENGERS, 1997, p.97). [37]
In a similar vein the police officers attempt to create a purified and stabilised 
forensic exhibit. They create the "pure object" that can be examined under the 
controlled conditions of the courtroom. Drawing on my above analysis, one could 
say that in this case purification means the extraction of time. The video recording 
is an attempt to extract, to remove actual time from the interviews, in order to 
create an artificially timeless, stable capture of an immediate instance of evidence 
emerging. As we could see it is this very attempt of stabilising and freezing an 
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objective capture of the evidence that betrays the effort, because facts do not 
travel well on video, the video resonates awkwardly with the time zone it is 
inevitably implanted into later on. During presentation time seeps back into the 
process because any viewing produces its own duration. This relates to the 
second resonance I would like to point out. There is an intriguing link to what 
ASHMORE, MCMILLAN and BROWN (2004) call "tape fetishism", that is, "the 
treatment of a tape as direct evidential record of a past event, and thus a quasi-
magical time machine." (ASHMORE et al., 2004, p.349). Following my analysis 
we could see that children's video recorded evidence has been designed to be 
exactly such a time machine, a fetish. Yet, the video itself is after all a witness 
with a character and a reputation as ASHMORE et al. outline. There is a 
mysticism of objectivity surrounding recorded material. And the indestructible 
credo of "What you see is what you get", it is what "really happened", has always 
been the devil in the detail for discourse analysts, legal professionals, jury mem-
bers and media spectators alike. Looking at recordings in qualitative research 
and in legal contexts, ASHMORE et al. examine the question of how we actually 
hear/see what is on tape and which rhetorical processes are concomitant with our 
decisions. Other than my analysis, their elaborations focus on the transcripts of 
tape recordings, hence they are virtually inspecting the "opposite end" of the 
phenomenon I have examined. Still, they come to a similar conclusion.
"… the tape is not and cannot function as a time machine. It cannot function in this 
way because there is never an unmediated hearing. […] As an artefact this tape may 
well appear as a fetish, but if it does so this is because it has already been subjected 
to a series of transformations, or translations. Its career as a fetish object begins not 
at the moment when it slips into the analyst's audio deck, but further back, when it is 
revised and catalogued, as a piece of research material […] and potentially even 
further back when the conditions of its recording are negotiated […]. Attending this 
chain of transformations allows us to see around the inevitability of tape fetishism" 
(ASHMORE et al., 2004, pp.370-371). [38]
I have explored some of the transformations and translations the video recorded 
evidence undergoes before and while it is being produced and put forward to the 
court as what appears to be, or is indeed hoped to be a fetish of objectivity. It is 
precisely because of its assumed role as a fetish that it backfires, because this 
status obscures the fact that it creates a short circuit between different time 
zones of veridicality. [39]
Video recorded evidence was set up in the well intended aim to deal with childhood 
ambiguity. It was to allow for children's voice to be heard in court in detail and in an 
unambiguous fashion, in order for it to be given due weight (as demanded by the 
UN Convention of Children's Rights), while addressing the problem of children's 
immature memory and their potential suggestibility. Yet, by short-circuiting the 
two time zones of veridicality, the video ends up creating more ambiguity than it 
resolves, and this will ultimately be at the children's cost. Firstly the police officer's 
attention is directed away from the individual child, as they try to correctly handle 
the paradox of performing simultaneously within/towards two time zones of 
veridicality while maintaining their own integrity. Secondly the video's showing in 
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court exposes the collision of time zones. And as the video betrays the 
courtroom's traditional expectations for emerging evidence, it becomes even 
more difficult for children's voice to be heard in court. So regardless of the 
officers' efforts, the video is not a time machine. In fact, the implicit discourses of 
children as unreliable containers, irritable dispenser and volatile interactants are 
still at work here, perpetuated by the practices surrounding the video and other 
special measures. [40]
Still, ASHMORE et al.'s considerations about the authenticity and productivity of 
recordings also throw a peculiar light on the nature of my own data and what I 
have let it say. Is what I heard all that can be heard? How can I be sure that what 
I outlined is what really happened during this police training course, or in court? 
And what does my analysis mean for this practice? These are important 
questions because they demarcate the concrete intersection of epistemological 
and methodological issues. My analysis has looked at the complex dynamics of a 
specific aspect of a practice, as it is inserted into-, operates and is expressed 
within the related historical, cultural and concrete momentary discourses. 
Obviously I cannot (and do not wish to) say that videos are "always" 
counterproductive or that police officers are "always" uncertain, or even to blame. 
And undoubtedly there are cases where a video has helped to get a conviction. 
Still, it has become clear that the video as a special measure carries a serious 
structural problem that undermines this practice above and beyond the question 
of how it is actually applied and whether anyone in particular should be blamed 
for "bad practice". Hence, having entered and traced this practice in quite some 
detail, I think it has also become clear that in order to make sense of what is 
happening here, we have to choose the second of the two philosophies LATOUR 
(1997) is proposing to us, the one that defines constructing and realising as 
synonymous. Because only then is it possible to begin to grasp the intricate 
connection between the historico-concrete dynamics around discourses of 
childhood, sexual abuse, memory, suggestibility and time, and the concrete 
attempts of the law to operate around childhood ambiguity. [41]
In this sense I would hope that my analysis bears enough relevance for the 
ongoing realisations around child witnesses, that it could become part of this 
process and thereby grow to be more than just a peculiar perspective onto legal 
practice. It could spark a dynamic that might help to engender change within the 
thinking around these serious problems.22 Obviously there is no way to predict the 
readiness of legal practice to consider time zones of veridicality, but I would 
suggest that matters of suggestibility and time can play a significant role in 
getting to grips with "what really happened". [42]
22 For further discussion of the problem of critical agendas for social change and the dilemma of 
self-positioning within critical practice research see MOTZKAU (in press); ZAVOS, MOTZKAU, 
CLARK and BIGLIA (2005).
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